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The paper by Tsakiris et al. reviews an important series of recent studies that have investigated body own-
ership and agency using techniques from experimental psychology and neuroimaging. The reviewed data high-
light the importance of multisensory as well as sensori-motor signals for both phenomena and tackle the
fascinating issue of how humans’ everyday (mostly unconscious) bodily experiences of ownership and agency
have been correlated with behavior and neural activation in controlled experiments. This is complemented by
an introduction to important philosophical issues raised by the neuroscience of ownership and agency. The
paper also reviews recent ﬁndings on the related topic of self-other discrimination. In what follows we have
focussed on open questions for future research that seem important in order to build a cognitive science
and cognitive neuroscience of bodily experience as well as bodily perception and cognition.2. Towards neurobiological deﬁnitions
Tsakiris et al. review evidence that suggests that ownership and agency are pre-reﬂective experiences that
are likely to be generated by low-level sensori-motor processes. But how exactly are ownership and agency
produced by these processes? What are the underlying neural mechanisms and their dynamical and computa-
tional principles? What are the neurological conditions where these processes break down? We note that at
present ownership and agency are far from being well-deﬁned concepts. Despite the importance of recent
eﬀorts reviewed by Tsakiris et al. (2007), we believe phenomena both need to be further deﬁned in behavioral
and neurobiological terms, as in the case of visual perception. It seems well grounded that a combination of
aﬀerent sensory signals and eﬀerent motor signals, as Tsakiris et al. suggest, are important sources for both
phenomena, yet predicted and actual sensory feedback, as well as prediction error signals will likely have
to be included as well. The lack of detailed computational models of ownership and agency formulated in
terms of aﬀerent sensory and eﬀerent motor signals further complicates their anchoring to neuronal activa-
tions as measured in neuroimaging studies, although the review has indicated several interesting directions.1053-8100/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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movements was varied systematically. When the visual feedback was incongruent, the authors noted that the
brain has to deal with two types of errors, i.e., a discrepancy between aﬀerent visual signals and aﬀerent pro-
prioceptive signals or between aﬀerent visual signals and eﬀerent motor signals. Additional central errors may
arise and have been argued to be of key importance in agency. Aﬀerent visual signals, aﬀerent proprioceptive
signals, and eﬀerent motor signals, are also compared with predicted sensory consequences using the eﬀerent
motor signals (Chapman, Bushnell, Miron, Duncan, & Lund, 1987; Voss, Ingram, Haggard, & Wolpert,
2006). Until latter errors as well as intersensory and sensori-motor errors are distinguished in greater detail,
functional interpretations of behavioral and neuroimaging studies as well as implications for philosophy will
remain ambiguous.
3. Neural substrates
Another point for future research on ownership and agency relates to providing causal evidence for the
reviewed distinct contributions of aﬀerent and eﬀerent signals. Such evidence could be searched for in clinical
conditions characterized by abnormal sensori-motor and/or multisensory processing. The authors review
recent work in neurological patients with damage to large myelinated somatosensory ﬁbers in the peripheral
nervous system leading to a selective deﬁcit in signaling of somatosensory information (Fourneret, Paillard,
Lamarre, Cole, & Jeannerod, 2002; Gallagher & Cole, 1995). Despite the importance of these patient studies,
it will be useful to carry out comparative analyses in other neurological patients suﬀering, for example, from
damage to peripheral motor ﬁbers. Other research on agency has focussed on psychiatric patients with
schizophrenia suﬀering from so-called delusions of agency (Daprati et al., 1997; Farrer et al., 2004; Spence
et al., 1997). The research on agency therefore investigated contributions of the peripheral somatosensory
nervous system or of high-level cortical motor systems. Surprisingly, the many intermediate stages of pro-
cessing are almost unexplored in neurological patients. This is unfortunate because the neuroimaging data
reviewed by Tsakiris et al. suggest the importance of several areas such as temporo-parietal cortex, premotor
cortex, insula, and primary somatosensory cortex for agency and ownership (Ehrsson, Spence, & Passing-
ham, 2004; Farrer et al., 2003, 2004; Spence et al., 1997; Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2006). Per-
formance and experience with respect to agency and ownership of neurological patients with selective
damage to any of these structures might reveal distinct contributions within the many layers of ownership
and agency.
4. Neuropsychology of ownership and agency
Even more importantly, several neurological conditions have been described over the last 60 years with pro-
found deﬁcits in ownership. These conditions include somatoparaphrenia (e.g., Gerstmann, 1942; Moro, Zam-
pini, & Aglioti, 2004), asomatognosia (e.g., Arzy, Petit, Landis, & Blanke, 2006; Critchley, 1953), and the alien
hand syndrome (e.g., Brion & Jedynak, 1972). Patients with somatoparaphrenia claim either that their con-
tralesional arm belongs to another person or that another person’s arm belongs to them (Gerstmann,
1942). Somatoparaphrenic ownership is thus characterized by the misattribution of another person’s upper
extremity (as in the RHI) or the misattribution of one’s own upper extremity. What is the performance of such
patients in ownership- and agency-related tasks that Tsakiris et al. have reviewed (if their motor weakness
allows testing)? Bodily experience and behavior in such patients will probably diﬀer from healthy subjects
and performance is likely to diﬀer for contra- and ipsilesional hands. Asomatognosia is also characterized
by a profound disturbance of bodily experience and such patients report not feeling or not seeing contralesion-
al body parts such as an arm or hand (Arzy et al., 2006) suggesting the possibility of preserved arm ownership
without feeling or seeing one’s arm. While brain damage in patients with somatoparaphrenia or asomatogn-
osia often includes temporo-parietal cortex, insula, and/or premotor cortex diﬀerent brain structures including
medial parietal cortex and the corpus callosum are aﬀected in patients with the alien hand syndrome (Brion &
Jedynak, 1972). These patients suﬀer from abnormal ownership (under somatosensory conditions) and do not
recognize their own left hand when holding it in their right hand, but do so when seeing it. They have normal
visual, tactile, proprioceptive, and motor functions. To summarize, investigations of abnormal ownership and
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suggested to be involved in ownership and agency should apply some of the experimental paradigms reviewed
by Tsakiris et al. This will allow to investigate hemispheric specialization, body-part speciﬁcity, and top-down
eﬀects of ownership and agency (Bottini, Bisiach, Sterzi, & Vallar, 2002), as well as other factors that are not
easily investigated in healthy subjects.
5. From anarchic hand to bimanual agency and intention
Anarchic hand (Feinberg, Schindler, Flanagan, & Haber, 1992; Goldberg, Mayer, & Toglia, 19821) and
diagonistic dyspraxia (Akelaitis, 1945; Tanaka, Yoshida, Kawahata, Hashimoto, & Obayashi, 1996) are
two other fascinating and relevant neurological conditions for the study of ownership and agency. They
are due to frontal and/or callosal damage and are characterized by unimanual or bimanual motor deﬁcits
and spontaneous non-intentional movements and are classically described as deﬁcits of volition and intention.
One could expect ownership and agency to be normal in such patients. However, experimental work in these
conditions is needed to help disentangling intention from agency and ownership (Jeannerod, 2006). Goldberg
et al. (1982) notes about a 63-year-old right-handed female patient with anarchic hand syndrome (due to left
medial frontal infarction) that ‘‘the patient had picked up a pencil and had begun scribbling with the [aﬀected]
right hand. When her attention was directed to this activity, she reacted with dismay, immediately withdrew
the pencil, and pulled the right hand to her side using the [normal] left hand. She then indicated that she had
not herself initiated the original action of the right arm. She often reacted with dismay and frustration at her
inability to prevent these unintended movements of the right arm. She experienced a feeling of dissociation
from the actions of the right arm, stating on several occasions that ‘‘it will not do what I want it to do’’. Thus,
one could speculate that the experience of being the author of her right dominant hand movements is dis-
turbed in this patient, while agency for left hand movements seems normal. This suggests distinct and later-
alized mechanisms of agency. Anarchic agency (and ownership) will probably diﬀer for both hands. Moreover,
the causing and the intending of an action both seem to be impaired in patients with anarchic hand syndrome.
Other lesions in this area may lead to diagonistic apraxia, a disorder of bimanual action that is deﬁned as
abnormal motor behavior of the left hand in conditions of voluntary movements of the right hand. Tanaka
et al. (1996) describe a patient who ‘‘when his right hand was trying to grasp a target [. . .], his left hand would
thrust itself into the ﬁeld and grasp the target ﬁrst, against his will. Or while he was trying to remove his under-
pants with his right hand, his left hand would suddenly reach over and raise the underpants. When he was
picking up his trousers from the ﬂoor with the right hand, the left hand would simultaneously begin to unbut-
ton his shirt.’’ Despite the recent advances in the cognitive neuroscience of ownership and agency both latter
neurological conditions leave the experimenter startled suggesting lateralized mechanisms as well as bimanual
mechanisms of ownership, and agency, and calling for more complex models of ownership and agency. We
further suggest that abnormal mechanisms of agency need to be distinguished experimentally from those of
intention in these conditions.
6. Computational neuroscience
In order to model the interactions between ownership and agency (and intention), a ﬁrst step will be their
anchoring to sensori-motor processes as suggested by Tsakiris et al. (2007), as computational models of sen-
sori-motor processes have already been developed and tested (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995). An
essential ingredient of these models is the use of so-called ‘‘forward models’’, which the brain may use to esti-
mate the current conﬁguration of the limbs based on eﬀerent copies of motor commands, previous estimates,
and aﬀerent sensory signals. The ﬁgure shows a sketch of such a model. Here, a motor forward model utilizes
an eﬀerent copy of a motor command in order to predict the state of limbs before the motor command has
been executed and sensory feedback received. Sensory forward models, however, may use the very same signal1 Note that there are inconsistencies with respect to the terms anarchic hand and alien hand. Here, we follow the initial French
terminology introduced by Brion and Jedynak (1972) for alien hand (‘‘la main etrange`re’’) without non-intentional motor behavior, as
opposed to anarchic hand (‘‘la main capricieuse’’) that is always associated with non-intentional motor behavior; see text).
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sensory inputs. Suppression of sensory inputs during active movement (Chapman et al., 1987; Voss et al.,
2006) could be explained in this way. Moreover, one could also postulate that agency might rather be related
to the proper matching of the predictions of sensory forward models and the actual sensory inputs as reﬂected
by a vanishing error signal. Conversely, the loss of agency might be identiﬁed with an error signal triggered,
for example, during incongruent visual feedback. In the same way, inter-sensory matches and mismatches
within the sensory systems (Fig. 1) might be identiﬁed with ownership and its loss when the discrepancy
between the aﬀerent visual and proprioceptive signals exceeds a certain size.
Does this application of computational models of sensori-motor processes to ownership and agency fully
capture both phenomena? Tsakiris et al. make two important points. First, they emphasize that ownership
might be more than mere multisensory stimulation. For example, during the RHI (Botvinick & Cohen,
1998), where the unseen real hand and the seen rubber hand are touched synchronously, subjects experience
that the felt touch is caused by the seen touch, and that this correlation may then create the feeling ‘‘as if the
rubber hand is my hand’’. This distinction between the multisensory stimulation (the causes) and the resulting
self-attribution of the rubber hand (the eﬀect) is important. But one could also conclude that multisensory
representations of the aﬀerent inputs could account for the perceptual experience of the seen touch causing
the felt touch, but not for the feeling of ownership of the fake hand. We like to point out that already the
computation of unisensory representations is a complex dynamic process involving the interaction of aﬀerent
feedforward signals and top-down predictions (for an example of the visual system: Rao & Ballard, 1999). The
computation of multisensory representations certainly involves those and even more complex interactions and
crosstalk between modalities and levels of processing. Currently, we do not know enough about these pro-
cesses or multisensory body representations. Studies modeling the computation of these representations will
be an important step towards developing quantitative notions of ownership and agency.
Second, Tsakiris et al. discuss the interesting ﬁnding that active movements might modulate body owner-
ship. Tsakiris, Prabhu, and Haggard (2006) have shown that the proprioceptive drift during the RHI is speciﬁcMotor forward model
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Fig. 1. Simpliﬁed sketch of a model for sensori-motor and multisensory processes and their role in ownership and agency. Ownership is
linked to inter-sensory matches of aﬀerent signals. Agency is identiﬁed with a vanishing error in predicting the sensory consequences of
intentional motor actions (for further detail see text).
L. Schwabe, O. Blanke / Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2007) 661–666 665to single digits when no voluntary movements are involved. More importantly, when the digit is actively
moved during stroking, the proprioceptive drift extends to the entire hand. In other words, active movements
seem to modulate the illusory localization of body parts beyond the stimulated body parts. Within the
sketched model (Fig. 1), this would mean that the eﬀerent copy of the motor command or the error signal itself
aﬀects multisensory body representations in more complex ways than just suppressing the sensory represen-
tations of the moving body part. Tsakiris et al. suggest that this interaction of signals that reﬂects active move-
ments and multisensory body representations could serve to integrate the sensory representations of distinct
body parts into a coherent representation of the hand.
7. Conclusions
It is an interesting idea that the brain may use signals corresponding to active movements in order to link
the representations of ﬁngers to each other and to build a representation of the entire hand. The study of
more global own body representations (as opposed to single ﬁngers) is relevant for the neuroscience of
the bodily self as the bodily self generally refers to the subject of experience. The presence of such global
own body representations is suggested by illusory own body perceptions called autoscopic phenomena due
to damage to temporo-parietal or occipito-temporal cortex (Blanke, Landis, Spinelli, & Seeck, 2004; Blanke
& Mohr, 2005; Brugger, Regard, & Landis, 1997; Devinsky, Feldmann, Burrowes, & Bromﬁeld, 1989). They
also suggest that comparable, but distinct, mechanisms of multisensory and sensori-motor integration exist
for the global representation of the entire body as opposed to the representations for certain body parts.
Multisensory mechanisms for such global ownership have recently been tested experimentally using virtual
reality in healthy subjects. Lenggenhager, Tadi, Metzinger, and Blanke (2007) showed that illusory self-attri-
bution and self-location can be induced for the entire body: During multisensory conﬂict participants con-
sidered a virtual body seen in front of them to be their own body and mislocalized themselves towards
the virtual body, to a position outside their bodily borders. This ﬁnding extends previous data on ownership
that have investigated body part ownership or the attribution and localization of a body part with respect to
the global self, i.e., a part-to-whole relationship. Importantly, illusory global self-attribution and self-location
to a position outside one’s body shows that global ownership (or selfhood) can be dissociated from one’s
physical body position concordant with altered selfhood in neurological patients with autoscopic phenomena
(Blanke et al., 2004). This diﬀers from the RHI where this aspect of selfhood remained constant and only the
attribution and localization of a stimulated ﬁnger or hand was manipulated (see also Ehrsson, 2007).
We conclude that the experimental behavioral paradigms and data reviewed by Tsakiris et al. make it now
possible to study selective aspects of ownership and agency of ﬁngers, arms, and bodies. These experimental
ﬁndings should be tested and extended (1) to neurological patients with abnormal ownership and agency, (2)
in neuroimaging studies, and (3) in modeling studies applying principles from computational neuroscience in
order to build up the ﬁeld of cognitive neuroscience of bodily experience, bodily perception and cognition as is
already the case in vision research.References
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